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Abstract
In a recent article, Corey Wrenn argues that in order to adequately address injustices done to animals, we
ought to think systemically. Her argument stems from a critique of the individualist approach I employ to
resolve a moral dilemma faced by animal sanctuaries, who sometimes must harm some animals to help
others. But must systemic critiques of injustice be at odds with individualist approaches? In this paper, I
respond to Wrenn by showing how individualist approaches that take seriously the notion of group
responsibility can be deployed to solve complicated dilemmas that are products of injustice. Contra
Wrenn, I argue that to adequately address injustice, acting individually, often within groups, is significantly
more important than thinking systemically.
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Introduction
In discussions of injustice, it is not uncommon for academics, especially sociologists and social
and political philosophers, to criticize the social institutions, structures, and systems that permit
and perpetuate injustice (Anderson; Ashford; Benton; Blau; Bonilla-Silva; Cudd; Feagin;
Gosepath; Hall; Parekh; Pogge; Wilson; Wrenn; Young). On the other hand, philosophers who
work in ethics tend to theorize about the concrete justice-based duties and responsibilities (both
backward and forward looking) of individuals like you and I, who are forced to make difficult
choices within unjust systems (Abbate; Bruckner; Fischer; Fischer and Demetriou; Fischer and
Milburn; Norcross; Singer; Zwolinski). Arguably, both systemic and individualist analyses are
needed if we are to respond effectively to injustice. While systems certainly play a role in
causing, perpetuating, and sustaining injustices, we cannot forget that these systems themselves
are caused, sustained, and perpetuated by individuals (Pogge). As Iris Marion Young notes, we,
as individuals, participate in the production and reproduction of structural injustice because we
act within accepted norms, rules, and practices of harmful systems. Without individual moral
agents, there would be no sexist, racist, ableist, or speciesist systems to criticize.
Although many injustices are perpetuated by harmful social institutions and systems,
they are ultimately caused and reproduced by a collection of individual acts. And because we are
forced to make painful choices from within these systems, we need clear answers to these
questions: What are our moral obligations, as individuals, in this world filled with injustice? How should
we resolve the moral dilemmas we face that arise from the many injustices in the world? When it comes to
the injustices done to animals, we cannot provide adequate moral guidance to individuals simply
by pointing out that speciesist systems are the root culprit of animal exploitation. Surely,
morality demands more than just system-critiquing.
The article ‘How to Help When it Hurts: Think Systemic’ by Corey Wrenn and my
essay ‘How to Help When it Hurts: The Problem of Assisting Victims of Injustice’ illustrate
important differences between systemic and individualist approaches to injustices. Both articles
address the moral dilemma animal sanctuaries encounter when they rescue obligate carnivores.
As I point out, in order to feed their obligate carnivores, wild animal sanctuaries must, in some
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way, participate in the intentional harming of other creatures, whether it be by purchasing
animal flesh from the grocery store or hunting wildlife. I argue that the lesser of the two evils is,
under certain conditions, hunting, and I advance an animal rights framework that explains why,
when feeding their carnivorous residents, animal sanctuaries should take up hunting ‘big game’
(under certain conditions) rather than purchase the flesh of farmed animals. Wrenn counters by
insisting that hunting causes more harm than does the purchasing of factory farmed products. In
particular, she argues that my individualistic approach overlooks the alleged fact that both
individual consumers and animal sanctuaries are embedded in a food system that renders them
powerless to effectively combat the harms that occur on animal farms.
In addition to criticizing my empirical claim that hunting ‘big game’ is less harmful than
purchasing factory farmed products from the grocery store, Wrenn challenges my individualist
methodology and faults me for not providing a systemic critique of the speciesist system, which
facilitates the moral conundrums animal sanctuaries face. As Wrenn points out, it’s because of
speciesism that animals are exploited in the circus industry and are then in need of rescue. And,
by inviting humans to observe their nonhuman residents, animal sanctuaries themselves may
perpetuate speciesism, thus it is questionable whether sanctuaries are good in-and-of themselves.
In what follows, I defend my original argument against several challenges presented by
Wrenn. In doing so, I critique Wrenn’s systemic methodology and her empirical claim that
purchasing factory farmed meat is less harmful than hunting. I moreover draw attention to the
ways in which Wrenn is overly pessimistic about the power of consumers to prevent terrible
harm to farmed animals, and overly optimistic about the power of individuals to change the
speciesist system itself. As I will show, the systemic approach fails to acknowledge that
dismantling the speciesist system is impossible without changes in diet and consumer behavior.
Consequently, we ought to reconsider seriously my proposal that in order to help, we
sometimes ought to hunt.
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On the Alleged Importance of Systemic Approaches
Wrenn is critical of what she refers to as case-by-case ‘individualist’ analyses of moral dilemmas,
claiming that they fail to acknowledge ‘the larger system in which these conflicts transpire as
malleable’ (150-151). She charges that the individualist moral conflicts, such as my animal
sanctuary conflict and Tom Regan’s lifeboat conflict, are ‘wielded unnecessarily to justify
continued systems of speciesism’ (Wrenn 153). Citing Marti Kheel, Wrenn claims that Regan
and I ‘miss the forests for the trees’ by ‘focusing on moral dilemmas rather than examining root
problems’ (Wrenn 159). Philosophical discussions of moral dilemmas, according to Wrenn,
‘exhibit a narrow outlook that obscures the larger environmental forces that initially manifest
the conflict and constantly shape the field in which the dilemma operates’ (159).
In the company of Ted Benton, Wrenn calls for a radical anti-speciesist transformation
of society, urging readers to ‘think systemically about social problems’ (151). When it comes to
injustices done to animals, she advises that, rather than dwell on individual lifestyle changes and
choices, we should focus on ‘the larger system of speciesism and its logic that nonhumans are
property that can be owned, used, consumed, and discarded for human want’ (Wrenn 152).
Her fundamental criticism of my argument is that it focuses on a single sanctuary issue that is
created by an oppressive system, ‘without offering a substantial critical analysis of the system
itself’ (160). Wrenn predicts that if the system is not addressed, we will forever face moral
dilemmas, such as the one I present. We must, as Benton suggests, eliminate the kinds of
institutionalized ‘reification’ and ‘commodification’ in our social relations with
nonhuman animals.
Yet, in my article, my fundamental goal is to apply Regan’s anti-speciesist framework of
animal rights to a moral dilemma faced by animal sanctuaries, thus there is no need to provide a
‘substantial critical analysis of the system itself’. I draw on Regan’s claim that animals have the
fundamental right to be treated with respect, and I insist that ‘we should immediately cease the
harming of them in the name of human interest, such as when we cause them to suffer and/or
die in order to use them for food, medical advancement, entertainment, and so forth’ (Abbate
144). As evidenced by our commitment to animal rights theory, Regan and I acknowledge the
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need for ‘system restructuring’, but we also acknowledge the tragic reality that, until we find
ourselves in an anti-speciesist utopia, we, as individuals, have difficult moral choices to make,
and to make the morally right choices, we require ethical guidance over and above the
recommendation that we ‘restructure the system’.
While institutional criticisms can be useful, surely not every academic article that
addresses a complicated moral conflict is required to provide a ‘substantial critical analysis of the
system itself’. After all, if we demand every article that addresses ethical quandaries involving
nonhuman animals to first provide a substantial critical analysis of the speciesist system, we
would never get to the question that really matters for individual moral actors and, in this case,
animal sanctuaries: Given the speciesist system that perpetuates so much terrible, unjust harm, how do I, as
one individual (or one sanctuary) do my part in making restitution to those animals who are victims of the
speciesist system? Because it is unlikely that speciesism will be abolished in my and Wrenn’s
lifetime, it is counterproductive to demand that individuals, instead of critically pondering reallife moral dilemmas, concern themselves only with dismantling the speciesist system. It surely is
not the case that ethicists can pursue justice only if they drop their moral inquiries into practical
dilemmas in order to single-mindedly develop systemic critiques.
It certainly is regrettable that there exist speciesist, racist, sexist, ableist, and
homophobic systems that perpetuate injustice to animals (human and nonhuman). But
institutional critiques often fail to transcend this descriptive claim. The cause of the injustices in
our world is not really a mystery. For example, it is no secret that that we live in a speciesist
world in which animals are wrongly viewed and treated as resources and property. Yet, until we
develop a rich account of individualist morality, it will remain unclear how individuals like you
and I ought to do our part in cleaning up the unjust mess we face, especially when helping may
require harming.
In some cases, systemic critiques inform us that we, as individuals, have some vague
‘political duty’ to change oppressive and unjust systems (Young; Sinnott-Armstrong). John
Broome, for instance, claims that citizens can fulfill the demands of ‘civic morality’ by engaging
in political action to get governments to do what they should, and Young claims that individuals
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have political responsibilities, which amount to reforming institutions and transforming
structural processes. Yet, neither describe how it is that individuals should go about doing this
(Zheng). In her defense, Young claims that political duties ‘carry considerable discretion’, and
thus agents can decide for themselves how to discharge their responsibilities (379).
Unfortunately, such advice is unhelpful for individuals who seek clear and feasible action
guidance that would enable them to transform larger social processes and structures (Scheffler),
especially since some political efforts do more harm than good (Hertel). Thus, some plausibly
argue that even if it is true that individuals have a duty to reform harmful systems (i.e.,
‘institutionalize’), this duty is arguably ‘hopelessly underdetermined’, insofar as it is not clear
how to carry it out (Mieth 179). Given the lack of specificity about the content of alleged
political duties and responsibilities, the individualist approach to injustice is indispensable, as it
provides clear action-guidance to individuals like you and I who want to make positive change in
this world infested with unjustly caused moral dilemmas.

On the Alleged Power to Dismantle the Speciesist System
While I am hopeful that consumers, including animal sanctuaries, can prevent harm to farmed
animals through collective purchasing decisions, Wrenn denies that consumers are powerful
enough to reduce global production of animal foods. Wrenn thus encourages readers, rather
than worry about the consumption behavior of others, to aim at eradicating the entire speciesist
system. Yet even if we grant that individuals have a fundamental obligation to change or
dismantle the system, Wrenn fails to provide an account of anti-speciesist-system activism,
vaguely suggesting that individuals ‘relegate resources to systemic change’ (174). Wrenn, like
Young, calls for political action, yet fails to provide an account of what this means.
Presumably, animal ethicists, including myself, and anti-speciesist sanctuary workers
wholeheartedly agree with Wrenn that animals are not mere tools for entertainment and that
the speciesist system is regrettable. I myself acknowledge that sanctuaries ought to educate the
public about the injustices of circuses, zoos, and wildlife ‘pet’ ownership, and many animal
sanctuaries make it a point to teach visitors about the wrongness of these practices. What more
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should individuals and sanctuaries do to make systemic change? Even if a satisfactory answer is
offered, individuals need practical guidance to behave justly within this system. After all,
instructing individuals to critique the speciesist system does not help sanctuaries solve the real
dilemmas they continually face – dilemmas that, as Wrenn rightly notes, are perpetuated by
speciesism. While these dilemmas are not, theoretically speaking, inevitable, practically speaking,
they will be unavoidable in the years of injustices to come.
It’s not uncommon for social philosophers and sociologists alike to claim that, when it
comes to large-scale collective action problem P that is caused by a massive collection of
individual acts of type X, individuals who perform type X acts don’t, by themselves, cause harm,
and thus individuals have no obligation to refrain from performing type X acts, despite that type
X acts are the very kind of acts that caused P in the first place. For instance, when it comes to
the problem of global warming, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that we, as individuals, have
no obligation to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions, given that our individual emissions do
not, by themselves, cause harm. Yet this doesn’t mean that individuals are off the hook, morally
speaking. After all, individuals have a duty to engage in political action. As Sinnott-Armstrong
argues, our ‘real moral obligations’ are ‘to get governments to do their job to prevent the
disaster of excessive global warming’ (312). While we need not refrain from carbon-emitting
behavior, we still ought to pressure our governments to change the law regarding carbon
emissions, or so it is argued.
But when it comes to political action, we just face another collective action problem. I
cannot, by myself, change government policies, nor can I, by myself, dismantle the speciesist
system. For political action to be effective we must engage in group action. Why, then, are we
not required to engage in non-political group action, or, as Broome puts it, ‘private morality’,
when it comes to moral problems like global warming and animal agriculture?1 Why are we not
obligated to coordinate with other individuals to reduce our carbon emissions and meat
consumption if we are obligated to coordinate with other individuals to engage in political action?
Consider meat eating. Wrenn advances the common argument that individuals and
animal sanctuaries are causally impotent when it comes to their purchasing behavior. She claims
176

HOW TO HELP WHEN IT HURTS
that, we, as individuals, or perhaps even as members of groups, cannot reduce harm to farmed
animals by adopting plant-based diets, insisting that ‘animal agriculture is minimally impacted by
consumer choices’ (Wrenn 172). What, then, is Wrenn’s recommendation to individuals who
desire to reduce harm to farmed animals? She advises that we address the structural problem of
speciesism (168), acknowledge the role of systems (172), and attack the system itself (173). But
how exactly do we do this? Wrenn’s answer is that this requires ‘large scale collective action and
the political reform of agricultural management practices to increase democratic access to
decision-making in food supply chains’ (173). For systemic change to be realized, power must
be somehow removed from corporations and redistributed among consumers (Wrenn 173).
Wrenn thus calls for a ‘critical reassessment of the status quo speciesism’ and she advises
sanctuaries and their supporters to ‘relegate resources to systemic change’ (174).
Presumably, Wrenn believes that some form of political, anti-speciesist collective
activism will reduce, if not eventually eliminate, injustices done to animals. So, essentially, she
assumes that (1) we, as individuals, have the power to initiate or promote some form of
collective political action, and (2) this collective political action will in fact be effective. As she
suggests, by engaging in group political action, we can effectively demand political reform of
agricultural management practices to increase democratic access to decision-making in food
supply chains (Wrenn 173). Yet she does not seem to believe that even a sizeable collection of
individuals, or what Hud Hudson and Larry May refer to as ‘members of loosely structured
groups’, can prevent harm to farmed animals by deciding to collectively cease purchasing
animal meat.
So, we must ask: (1) Which strategy is more likely to prevent harm to animals: (a)
encouraging individuals to refrain from purchasing meat or (b) encouraging people to group
together to engage in political action? To answer this, we must ask: (2) are individuals more
likely to engage in: (c) meat-abstaining behavior, or (d) political action? And (3) are collectiveacting animal rights activists more likely to change (e) the food system, or (f) the speciesist
system? Wrenn seems unhopeful than individuals will collectively cease the purchasing of meat,
pointing to the coercive influence of food suppliers and the government on consumer behavior.
Perhaps, then, Wrenn believes that (d) is more likely than (c). But even if a sizeable collection of
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individuals decides not to purchase meat, Wrenn does not seem to think that this will impact the
farming industry. So even if (c) is more likely than (d), Wrenn likely believes that (f) is more
likely than (e), and thus (b) is more likely than (a). Against this view, I will argue that (c) is
more likely than (d) and (e) is more likely than (f), thus (a) is more likely than (b).

On the Alleged Effectiveness of Collective Political Action
Often, when ethicists advise individuals to group together to engage in ‘non-political’ behavior
that may collectively make a difference, they ask individuals to refrain from performing harmful
activities. For instance, ethicists who believe in the power of group action might advise
individuals to refrain from purchasing animal products. In this case, consumers might ‘lose out’
on something they enjoy, but they gain something just as enjoyable: delightful and nutritious
plant-based alternatives. Yet, when we encourage individuals to engage in political group action
or fulfill what Elizabeth Cripps refers to as ‘promotional duties’, we ask them to perform positive
action – social movement action that is emotionally demanding and time consuming, insofar as it
requires significant personal dedication (Jacobsson and Lindblom; Mieth). Involvement in the
animal rights movement, for example, often dramatically transforms lifestyles, and many people
are not willing to make such fundamental changes to their behavior, even if they endorse antispeciesist beliefs (Herzog).
Surely, it is easier to encourage individuals to refrain from one kind of harm-causing
consumer behavior than it is to get them to engage in life-changing collaborative political action.
And, surely, it’s easier to motivate people to stop eating animals than it is to motivate people to
participate in anti-speciesism activism, as evident by the fact that only a small fraction of vegans
participates in animal rights activism. For one, there are several different motivations for
becoming vegan that are compatible with speciesist attitudes, such as concern for one’s personal
health and concern for the environment (Janssen et al.; Fox and Ward). Some studies find that
health is the key motivation for a shift to veganism (Dyetta et al.), which indicates that consumer
motivation for adopting a vegan diet does not always stem from a concern for animal welfare.
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Indeed, many people choose veganism or reduce their consumption of animal products even
though they embrace speciesist ideologies.
So, we have at least two options. As members of loosely structured groups, we can, as
Hudson advises, devise a decision-making procedure through which we can collectively cease
the purchasing of animal products. Or, as members of loosely structure groups, we can devise a
decision-making procedure through which we can collectively demand Wrenn’s vision of
political reform. While Wrenn might grant that it’s easier to motivate people to stop eating
animals than it is to motivate them to engage in political action, she may insist that it is, all things
considered, more effective to focus on wide-scale political action than it is to focus on widescale dietary change. Even if it takes longer to form a critical mass of political, anti-speciesist
activists, this may be, in the long run, what is needed to effectively reduce harm to animals.
But when it comes to affecting United States (U.S.) government policy, average citizens
and even mass-based public interest groups have little or no influence (Gilens and Page). Rather,
it is only economic elites and organized groups representing business interests that are powerful
enough to substantially impact U.S. government policy (Gilens and Page). As research indicates,
‘when a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they
generally lose’ (Gilens and Page 576). For one, business and economic interest groups, as
opposed to most public interest groups, are well-established – they have knowledge of the way
the system works and established contacts with members of legislature (Allen; Lutz and Lutz).
Agriculture interest groups, which are some of the most important interest groups operating in
the U.S., are large and well-funded, and thus the agricultural lobby repeatedly defeats the
efforts of animal rights interest groups (Ibrahim; Kreuziger; Matheny and Leahy). This perhaps
explains why U.S. states with economies that strongly depend on agriculture are less likely to
provide legal protection to animals (Lutz and Lutz 2011).
What we can take from this is that so long as economies are dependent on animal
agriculture, there will be a strong animal agricultural lobby that impedes the efforts of animalrights groups to enact policy-level change. To obtain the policy-level change that Wrenn
envisions, the animal agriculture lobby must be weakened, and this will happen only if there is a
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dramatic decrease in demand for animal products. After all, if there is a sharp decrease in
demand for animal-based foods, economies will shift from animal-agriculture based to plantbased, and, consequently, there will be an emergence of well-funded plant-based companies and
politically influential economic and business interest groups that aim to promote the interests of
plant-based food companies.
Essentially, Wrenn suggests that animal rights activists skip over agents that influence
government policies (such as powerful animal agriculture companies and interest groups) and
deal directly with the government itself. Yet, empirical research reveals that this strategy is not
effective. Animal rights groups will fail to get state legislatures to change the law if powerful
economic and business interest groups oppose the proposed changes (Gilens and Page).
Significant harm to farmed animals will be prevented most effectively if there is a sharp decline
in demand for animal meat.

On the Alleged Impotence of Consumer Behavior
Wrenn objects to my hunting proposal because she believes that hunting ‘may actually cause
more hurt than would the purchasing of slaughterhouse byproducts’ (151).2 As she argues, (1)
purchasing factory farmed products does not cause harm, while (2) hunting does cause additional
harm. In support of the first claim, Wrenn avers that while public consumption is controlled by
producers, consumers have minimal power ‘within a system that is designed to promote and
protect speciesist consumption patterns’ (161). One reason that food systems are said to be
seller-controlled rather than buyer-controlled is that meat and dairy are allegedly ‘forced on
Americans’ (Wrenn 161). As Wrenn argues, artificially low prices, heavy advertising, targeted
marketing, and misleading nutritional advice effectively coerce consumers into buying
animal products.
What Wrenn says here is not particularly relevant to the moral dilemma I consider.
After all, I do not ask whether the average consumer is morally permitted to purchase factory
farmed meat, nor do I question whether meat consumers make authentic purchasing choices. I
do not deny that some meat consumers are coerced into buying meat due to artificially low
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prices, heavy advertising, and misleading nutritional advice, nor do I deny that corporations
retain disproportionate power over the food system. I can grant Wrenn’s claim that many
uninformed and disempowered consumers do not make authentic choices when they purchase
meat and still question whether it is morally permissible for animal sanctuaries – i.e., entities that
presumably, after thinking long and hard about animal exploitation, can see through this alleged
coercion – to purchase factory farmed products. Arguably, animal sanctuaries have more moral
willpower and ethical awareness than the average consumer, so we cannot excuse the potentially
problematic consumer behavior of sanctuaries on the grounds that the meat industry ‘coerces’
the typical consumer into purchasing animal products.
Wrenn then advances a more plausible argument: the ‘vegan boycott’ won’t cause a
decline in the production of animal products, because such boycotts are ‘no match for the
capitalist system’s well-oiled treadmill of production’ (161). She thus contends that the
purchasing behavior of animal sanctuaries is unlikely to change the food system. Because Wrenn
believes that consumer demand and choices can’t even reduce harm to animals, she predicts that
when animal sanctuaries purchase factory farmed meat, it is unlikely that they ‘aggravate the
injustice already done to food animals, who, regardless of sanctuary procurement decisions, will
continue to suffer and die as long as systemic conditions remain unaltered’ (162).
Wrenn is not alone in her lack of faith in consumer power. Critics of veganism have
long advanced what has come to be known as the ‘causal impotence’ objection, which essentially
claims that because the meat industry is so large, it is insensitive to one person’s decision to
become vegan. As the argument goes, one consumer’s decision to go vegan will not reduce the
number of animals raised and killed on factory farms, as the meat industry does not reduce its
supply of animals just because one person stopped eating animals (Frey; Harris and Galvin;
Shafer Landau). Individual consumers are thus assumed to be incapable of preventing harm to
farmed animals. Compelling responses to this causal impotence objection have been thoroughly
defended in the literature (Kagan; Matheny; Norcross), so there is no need to rehash them here.
Wrenn is certainly correct to say that one individual’s choice, or even a group of
individual choices, cannot, by itself, ‘feed structural change’. But one thing to note is that I do
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not think that animal sanctuaries, by hunting and refusing to purchase animal products, will
‘change the structure’. My point is that it is less harmful to hunt than it is to purchase factory
farmed products. After all, ‘the system’ is, to some degree, influenced by consumer behavior. As
Alastair Norcross (2004) compellingly argues, there is some threshold at which the number of
vegans will influence the market and thereby reduce the number of sentient animals raised and
killed for food. And animal sanctuaries can be part of that number. Thus, one or more of a
sanctuary’s acts of buying animal flesh may be what Shelly Kagan calls the ‘trigger’ act that
causes the harming of some animals.
There is ample empirical evidence that the collective activity of individual consumers is
making positive change in the food industry. Consider the recent sharp increase in demand for
vegan products in the U.S. alone. Reports by Nielsen Holdings show that from 2016-2017, sales
of plant-based foods increased approximately 8%, and from 2017-2018, sales of plant-based
foods increased 20%, while overall U.S. food sales rose only 2% (Plant Based Foods
Association). Surely, the best explanation for the increased production and purchases of vegan
goods is the tremendous growth in collective consumer demand for vegan food. Wrenn,
though, believes that as demand for vegan products increases in America and demand for animal
flesh decreases, the meat industry will invent new products or expand into new markets.
According to this logic, even if consumers collectively cause a noticeable decrease in demand for
animal products in America, this will not spare any animal suffering.
There are several problems with Wrenn’s reasoning. First off, we might ask: if it is
profitable for meat companies to move into other markets, why haven’t they done so already?
Why would they wait for a sharp decrease in demand for animal-based products in the U.S.?
Presumably, if it’s possible for these powerful meat producers to capitalize by expanding to
international markets, they will quickly seize the growth opportunity. This explains why Tyson
Foods has already, without waiting for the rise of veganism in the U.S., expanded to overseas
markets and now ships its products to 115 countries (Tyson Foods). And one reason why Tyson
Foods and other U.S. meat producers haven’t expanded even further is due to the problems of
changing global trade policies, trade wars, and the uncertainty of tariffs. Because the
international market environment is so volatile and uncertain, it’s not so easy, as Wrenn
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suggests, for meat companies to just move into new overseas markets when demand decreases in
the U.S. The U.S. in particular faces significant barriers for exporting meat in the global market
(Fields et al.). So even if meat companies expand into international markets when demand for
animal flesh decreases in the U.S., the operating costs inevitably will rise – costs that are passed
on to the consumer, which drives down consumption. And if both the supply and demand for
animal flesh decrease (relative to the prior level of supply and demand in the U.S.), this means
that fewer animals will be raised and killed, and thus the amount of farmed animal suffering will
be lower than it would be if meat companies successfully sold to U.S. consumers.
While Wrenn seems confident that the meat industry’s first response to falling demand
of animal flesh will be to move into international markets, she fails to consider the likely
possibility that the meat industry will make new products that cater to adapting preferences of
consumers. This means that rather than expand into international markets with high tariffs, U.S.
meat companies may produce, or increase their production of, vegan food domestically. Indeed,
the animal food industry has already invented new vegan products in response to the growing
demand for vegan food products. For instance, by the end of 2019, Tyson Foods, America’s
largest meat producer, is planning to launch a new line of meat alternatives, including plantbased nuggets. According to the CEO of Tyson Foods, Noel White, this decision is in direct
response to the rising, demand for vegan products compared with beef, pork, and poultry
products. As White puts it:
That’s where the growth is at. There’s a growing number of people that want to eat a
product that they view as being healthier for them and it may be non-animal protein…
We have teams of people committed to bringing these products to market quickly. It’s
an area that we are investing in sizably and we will be in the market this calendar year –
and maybe sooner than you think. (Mercy for Animals)
The growth of the meat alternative sector was predicted back in 2017, when the former CEO of
Tyson Foods, Tom Hayes, remarked that, ‘plant-based protein is growing almost, at this point,
a little faster than animal-based, so I think the migration may continue in that direction’ (Mercy
for Animals). Perhaps, then, this is why Tyson Foods invested in the plant-based company
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Beyond Meat in 2016 and still invests in the clean meat companies Memphis Meats
and MycoTechnology.
Tyson Foods is not the only animal-based company to launch vegan products. In 2019,
Chobani released a new line of plant-based yogurts and Hellman’s released a vegan mayonnaise
alternative in 2016. In fact, before releasing their vegan mayonnaise alternative, Hellman’s
(Unilever), the world’s largest condiment company, launched a lawsuit against a vegan startup
company, Hampton Creek (now JUST), for ‘false advertisement’. Hellman’s claimed that
Hampton Creek led customers to believe that their plant-based ‘Just Mayo’ product was
traditional mayonnaise, which, by definition, includes at least one egg. In response to the
lawsuit, celebrity Andrew Zimmern started a Change.org petition against the lawsuit that
garnered over 112,00 signatures. This petition raised public awareness about and incited
backlash against the lawsuit, which pressured Hellman’s to altogether drop the lawsuit
(Kaufman). After dropping the lawsuit, Hellman’s produced their own vegan mayonnaise spread
under the label ‘Best Friends Carefully Crafted Dressing and Sandwich Spread’.
This event, which involved a small start-up vegan company prevailing over ‘Big Food’,
serves as a counter example to Wrenn’s claim that corporate elites have complete control over
both supply and demand in the food industry. And it serves as a counter example to Wrenn’s
prediction that when demand for animal-products decline, animal food companies will just
invent new animal products or expand to other markets. As this event indicates, traditional
animal-based food companies may themselves produce vegan products in response to changes in
consumer behavior – a decision that is surely to the benefit of farmed animals. While this event
certainly demonstrates the uphill battle vegan companies endure in a currently animal-product
dominated food industry, it also demonstrates the power that small start-up companies and
individual consumers have, when they act in groups, to gain some control over the
food industry.
Perhaps, though, Wrenn is worried that animal-based food companies will, in addition
to creating vegan products in America, expand into international food markets. But even if meat
companies expand to emerging markets, they may produce vegan products for these markets.
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For instance, although Tyson Foods has facilities in India, they boast on their website of having ‘a
vegetarian protein options as well’ to serve the demand of consumers in India. Because it’s
predicted that, by 2040, 60% of meat will be cultured meat or plant-based meat (AT Kearney),
we can expect that other meat companies will follow in Tyson Foods’ footsteps.
And even if the meat industry, as Wrenn predicts, tries to expand its animal-based
products to Asian and African markets, the alternative meat industry can do so, too, and, in
many cases, more successfully. After all, veganism is an increasing global trend (Davis and
Melina; Radnitzer et al.), and the market segment of meat alternatives is rapidly growing. For
instance, surveys indicate that people from the Asia Pacific region and Africa are still more likely
to follow a vegan diet than Americans (Statista). Moreover, a 2019 study on consumer behavior
shows that there is a higher acceptance of clean and plant-based meat in India and China
compared to the U.S. (Bryant et al.). 62% of Chinese respondents and 62% of respondents in
India indicated that they were likely or very likely to purchase plant-based meat, while only 32%
of participants from the U.S. said that they were likely or very likely to purchase plant-based
meat (Bryant et al.). This indicates that, due to the growing popularity of veganism, the India
and China food markets are perhaps the best markets for plant-based meats, as this is where we
can expect the vegan food market to grow the fastest.
Because of the rapidly increasing global interest in plant-based foods, Western vegan
companies have already expanded into Asian markets. For instance, the plant-based Impossible
Burger is sold in more than 100 restaurants in Hong Kong and Macau, and Impossible Foods
plans to expand its presence into mainland China by 2021 (Yau). JUST and Beyond Meat both
plan to start distributing their vegan products to China by the end of 2019 (Yau). Because the
Chinese government recently announced a plan to reduce domestic meat consumption, it is
likely that other vegan Western start-up companies will expand into China’s market. As the
global vegan meat market grows, we can expect to see a proliferation of vegan food companies
enter both domestic and international markets.
Finally, because the global vegan market is growing rapidly, we can expect to see an
increase of local Asian and African vegan meat companies entering emerging markets. For
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instance, the company JUST (formerly Hampton Creek) is currently working with Hong Kongbased Brinc’s Food Technology Accelerator to help plant-based food businesses bring their
products to market in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, Dao Foods, a Chinese venture established to
introduce plant-based and clean meat into the China market, is assisting New Crop Capital, a
U.S. specialized private venture fund, to source and invest in Chinese plant-based ventures,
effectively helping Chinese plant-based meat manufacturers go mainstream. At first, Dao Foods
considered introducing Western meat alternative companies to the mainstream market in China,
but upon reconsideration, determined that there are at-home opportunities to take advantage of
– Chinese alternative meat companies that are equivalent to Beyond Meat and Impossible Foods
(Yau).3 The movement to bring the alternative meat market to China likely comes in response to
a poll that indicated that between 2015-2020, the Chinese vegan market was expected to grow
by more than 17% (Moon). Indeed, the vegan movement is just beginning, and we can only
expect future vegan meat market growth both domestically and internationally.

On the Alleged Causal Efficacy of Hunting
Having argued that animal agriculture is impacted by consumer behavior, I will now argue that
hunting itself might be causally inefficacious. First, recall that Wrenn insists that purchasing
farmed animal meat ‘pulls from an existent system of harm, whereas “hunting” creates additional
harm’ (164). Relatedly, she claims that hunting increases harm to animals and perpetuates a
system of oppression, but that purchasing the flesh of farmed animals is not likely to increase
harm because farmed animals are ‘destined for death’ in a seller-controlled food market. She
then concludes that purchasing animal meat is ‘significantly less harmful than “hunting” because
it capitalizes on harms that will be committed regardless of sanctuary choices’ (Wrenn 166). On
the other hand, Wrenn suspects that my hunting proposal would initiate ‘new lines of
oppression’ (165). She thus proposes that ‘taking advantage of preexisting oppression is
preferable’, as sanctuaries allegedly do when they purchase farmed animal flesh (165).
In support of the claim that hunting perpetuates oppression, Wrenn says that wildlife
‘management’ departments, which have control over ‘big game’ populations, ‘maintain a
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constant supply of victims for paying consumers’ (154). Inflated populations are essentially a
product of ‘human engineering’, as ‘management’ efforts intentionally and artificially promote
increased ‘big game’ reproduction for hunting purposes. As Wrenn charges, hunting
‘management’ programs are profit-driven, resulting in millions of dollars for the hunting
industry each year.
One might wonder why she finds it problematic for animal sanctuaries to capitalize on
the hunting system of artificial population growth, but grants sanctuaries permission to capitalize
on the system of factory farming, which also involves the active renewal of animal communities
for public consumption. Wrenn’s response is that there’s a relevant difference between
capitalizing on the hunting system and capitalizing on the animal agriculture system: if
sanctuaries were to adopt my hunting proposal, they would, unlike typical consumers of animal
flesh, increase the death toll of animals.
Yet, this wouldn’t always be the case. Consider, for instance, that, in most Colorado
‘big game management units’, there is a limited number of big game hunting licenses, and each
license grants a hunter permission to kill only one animal (Colorado Parks and Wildlife). In
most cases, hunters are limited to two ‘big game’ licenses per season (Colorado Parks and
Wildlife). Perhaps Colorado animal sanctuaries could work with Colorado Parks and Wildlife to
secure a number of these limited licenses each hunting season. For instance, say one game unit
sells only 1,000 deer licenses each season. If a sanctuary purchased 250 of these licenses, how
would it, as Wrenn puts it, ‘create a measurable increase in speciesism’ (173)? After all, if the
sanctuary doesn’t purchase the licenses, 250 other hunters will, thus resulting in 250 deer death
all the same. If wildlife ‘managers’ are in the hunting business just for monetary reasons, they
likely wouldn’t care whether the revenue from hunting licenses comes from recreational hunters
or from sanctuaries.
Perhaps, though, Wrenn might say that there’s a chance that no one will buy these 250
hunting licenses. It’s plausible that only 750 licenses will be sold a given season, so if a sanctuary
purchases the 250 licenses, 250 deer who would not have otherwise been killed will be shot
dead.4 But if it is anticipated that the demand for hunting licenses will be less than 1,000 in a
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given season, why wouldn’t the hunting industry ‘expand to other markets’, for instance, by
using targeted marketing in an effort to encourage women and children to hunt? In fact, this is
already happening in some areas. For instance, in response to an anticipated decline in demand
for hunting licenses, Colorado Parks and Wildlife recently implemented over a dozen events
that aim at teaching women how to hunt (Ogburn).
It’s worth noting that Wrenn grants that there are some cases of deer overpopulation,
although she emphasizes that this problem was created artificially. Wildlife managers have, for
instance, eradicated natural predators and artificially increased deer reproduction. But even if
the overpopulation problem stems from questionable wildlife ‘management’ practices, it’s
unclear why Wrenn refuses to grant sanctuaries permission to benefit from the problem, yet
supports their decision to benefit from the artificially created problem of animal agriculture.
If the structures of animal agriculture and hunting in at least some big game management
units are morally comparable and sanctuaries, in order to feed their obligate carnivores, need to
participate in one of these practices, they should opt for participating in the least morally
objectionable practice. Surely, hunting in specific units where there are limited hunting licenses
(and each license permits hunters to kill only one animal), is the lesser evil of the two. As
Wrenn herself notes, deer are not confined to feedlots or artificially inseminated, and they have
the relative privilege of residing in wild spaces, enjoying some degree of freedom. Meanwhile,
farmed animals are imprisoned on farms for their entire lives and are made to suffer horribly.
They are victims of what Michael Huemer rightly calls ‘the world’s worst problem’ (51).

On My Alleged Speciesism
Throughout her paper, Wrenn suggests that my hunting proposal is speciesist, insofar as it
promotes the killing of only deer (and other ‘big game’), thus failing to consider the option of
killing ‘privileged species’, such as cats and dogs (156). According to Wrenn, deer, unlike cats
(big or small) and dogs, are ‘traditionally devalued animals’ and ‘the most marginalized’, and
this explains why they, and not charismatic animals, are frequently ‘designated for systematic
killing’ (157-158). She insists that ‘large carnivores are at a distinct advantage as they represent
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species that are frequently granted some semblance of personhood and reverence in many
cultures and rarely are they categorized as a normative foodstuff’ (158). The implication is that
my alleged speciesism (i.e., my alleged preference for charismatic animals) is what drives me to
argue that we ought to save big cats in sanctuaries, even if it means killing deer.
Wrenn is right to suggest that many humans, especially in Western countries, adore cats
and dogs. But this means little when it comes to the wellbeing of these animals, and it certainly
does not entail that they are ‘privileged’. Most cats in the U.S., for instance, are confined to the
indoors for their entire lives. Surely, the fact that much of the suffering cats endure stems from
‘well-meaning’ human adoration does not make a difference to the wellbeing of the cats
permanently imprisoned in human homes, deprived of the opportunity to exercise their basic
hunting and territorial capacities and sentenced to a life of boredom and frustration. If Wrenn
sees feline imprisonment as a privilege, then she must believe that life in the ‘wild’ is so
unpleasant that permanent confinement is preferable, which undermines her claim that freeliving animals, such as deer, do not, as I suggest, endure extreme hardships in the wild.
Moreover, the ‘charisma’ of megafauna, such as big cats, puts them at a severe
disadvantage relative to deer, insofar as this ‘charisma’ is the reason megafauna are regularly
confined and put on display in zoos and circuses. Relatedly, charismatic animals are often
victimized through ‘trophy hunting’, as evidenced by the fact that lion populations are sharply
declining throughout the world due to hunting safari parties. Currently, lions are listed as
‘vulnerable’, which is just one step from endangered, and all tiger species are listed as
endangered under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, thanks to habitat destruction and poaching
(Braun). Tigers now occupy only 7 percent of their historical range, and, regrettably, the
majority of the world’s tigers live in confinement (Dinerstein et al.).
Tigers are moreover killed for traditional Chinese ‘medicine’, and the use of tigers for
this purpose is intimately connected to the awe and reverence they inspire – the very awe and
reverence that supposedly gives them ‘privilege’. Tigers were historically worshipped by tribal
cultures for their power and mystery and were viewed as having magical powers and important
medicinal properties. By using tigers in medicine, it was thought that people could absorb the
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tiger’s life force, vigor, strength, and attributes (Guynup). Although tiger killing is now illegal,
this has not stopped tiger poaching and the selling of tiger bodies for ‘medicinal’ purposes
(Graham-Rowe).
Arguably, our awe for cats (big and small) is not doing them any favors. But even if we
grant that it does, we must ask: why should cats in animal sanctuaries, i.e., cats who have been
treated unjustly, pay the price? Why should they be sentenced to death just because they are
members of a species that is often characterized as ‘charismatic?’ Here, we face a similar
question that Wrenn asks: why should deer pay the price of the injustices we’ve done to big
cats? It is certainly unfair that either cats or large-bodied prey like deer must be killed in order
to clean up one of the very many unjust messes our species has caused. But one important
difference between free-living deer and captive cats is that cats in captivity have been unjustly
denied the opportunity to fend for themselves, insofar as humans have wrongfully taken from them
their capacity to hunt. And were these cats able to hunt on their own in the ‘wild’, they would
kill and eat deer and other large-bodied prey. Thus, we might consider my proposal to be one of
‘killing by proxy’. The very least we can do for captive animals is provide for them what they
would have taken for themselves, had they not been victims of injustice.

Lessons from Wrenn
Despite the noted difficulties with her systemic approach, Wrenn offers important practical
advice for sanctuaries to follow. For instance, she urges sanctuaries that refuse to accept roadkill
donations to revisit their roadkill policies, and she rightly suggests that sanctuaries make use of
the billions of pounds of consumable food that is disposed of as ‘garbage’ each year in the U.S.
alone, much of which is animal protein. Surely, if sanctuaries did these things, they would
drastically reduce the hurt they cause.
Wrenn also rightly draws attention to the stress that animal sanctuary residents likely
endure as a result of ‘forced human interaction’ (168), the problem of ‘pseudo-sanctuaries’
(169), and the suffering big cats might endure in sanctuaries due to their inability to range and
hunt.5 It’s worth noting, though, that Wrenn lumps all big cats together, despite the fact that
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lions and tigers are very different from one another. For one, lions are more likely to fare better
in animal sanctuaries than tigers, due to the social nature of lions. To see why this is, consider
the following.
At the Wild Animal Sanctuary in Colorado, all newly rescued big cats must be
‘rehabilitated’ before they can enter large acreage natural habitats. Big cats are thus first
confined to rehabilitation areas, where they can adjust to the sanctuary environment and
socialize with other feline residents. The big cats are not moved from the rehabilitation areas
until they have built relationships with other cats, as when they are moved to the large acreage
habitats, they must be moved in ‘cohesive groups’. Because of their social nature, lions move
relatively quickly from the rehabilitation area to their large acreage habitat. But because tigers
are solitary, less social animals, it is difficult for them to form bonds with other tigers, thus they
are more likely to spend more time, if not their entire lives, in the ‘rehabilitation area’, which is
much smaller than the large acreage habitats. So while there is some truth to Wrenn’s claim
about the suffering of big cats in sanctuaries, we must remember that some are more capable of
flourishing in confinement than others, and this ought to be taken into account when we make
heart-wrenching decisions about who lives and who dies.
Despite the many obstacles sanctuaries inevitably face as they attempt to promote the
well-being of their residents, sanctuaries can take steps to reduce, if not eliminate, the
frustrations that Wrenn mentions. The Wild Animal Sanctuary in Colorado serves as a model
sanctuary when it comes to promoting the well-being of its animal residents, who reside
peacefully in large acreage habitats. Acknowledging that human visitors cause stress to animals
when they approach animal enclosures, the Wild Animal Sanctuary built mile-long elevated
walkways and decks over the animals’ habitats, and they permit visitors to view animals only on
these walkways. Because these animals do not consider the air or sky to be their territory,
visitors can now observe animals without inflicting stress upon them, according to the Wild
Animal Sanctuary.
As for sanctuary visitors? We can do our due diligence to avoid supporting unethical and
pseudo sanctuaries by thoroughly researching sanctuaries before providing them with financial
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support. And, as the Wild Animal Sanctuary advises, we can spread the word to other
sanctuaries so that they will change their systems such that they better accommodate the needs
and desires of their residents, who are due our utmost attention and care.

Conclusion
If we dismiss real-life moral dilemmas and think only ‘systemically’, then we will deprive
ourselves of important opportunities to reflect upon the real, concrete ways in which we can act
to make restitution to the nonhuman victims of injustice who enter our lives. To act justly, we
must not only think systemically, but we must also act individually, often within groups. And we
must acknowledge that, because our world is so unjust, we may not be able to keep our hands
clean. Some may get hurt. Others may be left behind to fend for themselves. It is a tragic reality
that there is no ‘feel good’ solution to the havoc our species has wreaked upon other animals. As
Regan has warned, ‘the fate of animals is in our hands. God grant we are equal to the task’ (26).
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Notes
1

By ‘nonpolitical’ group action, I mean coordinated changes in everyday behavior, such as the

collective decision to stop eating meat-eating or the collective decision to reduce carbon
emitting behavior.
2

It’s unclear why Wrenn talks in terms of ‘byproduct’ when sanctuaries purchase animal flesh,

and not just the secondary parts of animals, i.e., animal byproduct.
3

In China, the vegan company Whole Perfect Food, with the aid of government officials,

created a national-level research institute at Shenzhen University for soy protein isolate and
other vegan products (Yau 2019), and in Hong Kong, a company called Right Treat has just
launched Omnipork, which is a plant-based pork alternative.
4

In Colorado, if there are left over limited licenses, these licenses are sold, and deer and elk

hunting applicants have the first choice of the limited licenses, before they go on sale to the
general public. Since, in most units, hunters are limited to two limited big game licenses per
season, presumably a good number of hunters welcome the opportunity to purchase the leftover
licenses, so that they can kill more than two ‘big game’ animals per season.
5

It’s worth noting that Wrenn (2018) claims that those who insist that cats need to eat meat

promote ‘the romanticized notion that lions and other big cats must feed on “wild caught”,
“hunted” prey to serve their primal essence’ (162). Perhaps by insisting that big cats need to hunt,
Wrenn is guilty of doing the same.
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